The Input, Coherence, Generativity (ICG) Factors : Towards a Model of Cognitive Informativity Measures for Productive Cognitive Systems by Olteteanu, Ana-Maria
The Input, Coherence, Generativity (ICG)
Factors. Towards a Model
of Cognitive Informativity Measures for
Productive Cognitive Systems.
Ana-Maria Oltet¸eanu
Cognitive Systems, Universita¨t Bremen
Bremen, Germany
amoodu@informatik.uni-bremen.de
Abstract. Classical thinking on information and informativity consid-
ers the informee as a perfect information receiver. However, when study-
ing productive natural and artiﬁcial cognitive systems, cognitively based
models of informativity need to be formulated. Three factors relevant
to cognitive informativity measures are proposed: Input, Coherence and
Generativity (ICG). These factors take into account the type of Input
which can be stored, the Coherence of the system after acquiring the in-
formation, and the Generativity of the system after the new information
was integrated.
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1 Introduction
Various ways of thinking about information exist [29, 7], which imply diﬀer-
ent ways of measuring informativity. Between information as data communica-
tion, and information as semantic content, informativity either considers data
in its probabilistic nature and ability to surprise the informee1[28], or its well-
formedness, meaningfulness or truthfulness.
However, such informativity measures seem to consider the informee as a per-
fect information receiver - one that can comprehend, memorize and utilize what-
ever information it is given. This does not cover the perspective of productive
natural or artiﬁcial cognitive systems, which enter any information gathering act
with cognitive economy priorities, computational constraints, and which dynam-
ically use information and their knowledge in order to produce more knowledge
and create new artifacts.
The measures of cognitive informativity proposed here stem from general
cognitive principles of information representation, structuring and processing.
They reﬂect the subjective nature of every informational act as involving the
1 The information receiver.
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interaction between the informant2 and an individual informee. Any individual
informee is seen as a cognitive system. Far from being an empty vat, an informee
already holds various types of knowledge structures, which can be used for (or
stand in the way of) the acquisition of new knowledge (the Input factor).
Furthermore, the consequences of the informant being integrated in the knowl-
edge base (KB) of the informee can vary, depending on whether such added in-
formant makes the knowledge base more coherent, easier to navigate, or adds to
its entropy (the Coherence factor).
Finally, as we consider the capacity of a cognitive system to be productive
(i.e. able to creatively solve problems, create new artifacts, make new inferences)
to be essential, the third factor in this cognitive informativity model relates to
whether the informant leaves the informee with a better or worse ability to
generate new cognitive artifacts (the Generativity factor).
The main contribution of this paper is thus to lay the foundations for a model
of cognitive informativity under the general paradigm of productive cognitive
systems.
Ways to evaluate computational creativity systems have been proposed [32,
26, 25, 4], however they deal with the assessment of an artefact or a process as
creative, not with the impact an informant has on the generativity of a system.
Steps towards the cognitive modeling of creativity have been made [30, 22, 23],
some of which propose approaches in which structure is relevant. However, the
impact a new informant has on the knowledge base of the informee has not been
assessed from the perspective of cognitive creative systems.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. First, arguments from cogni-
tive science and AI which support the direction of the cognitive informativity
measures further proposed are presented in Section 2. Based on these arguments,
an initial analytic toolkit is layed down in Section 3.
Taking into account the information already present in the informant’s knowl-
edge base and its structure, three main factors relevant to setting cognitive in-
formativity measures are described - Input, Coherence and Generativity. Each
of these factors is then analysed in turn, together with ensuing possible infor-
mativity measures (Sections 4-6). Implications of the model are discussed and
further work proposed in Section 7.
2 Setting the stage
To further clarify why cognitive informativity measures are necessary and set the
analytic toolkit for deﬁning important factors, in this section: (1) the case for
structured representations in AI and cognitive science is discussed; (2) primary
tools for estimating measures of informativity are presented and (3) the diversity
of ways of knowing available to a cognitive system is discussed and exempliﬁed.
2 The information transmitted.
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2.1 The case for structured representation
Structured representations are posited quite often in cognitive science and artiﬁ-
cial intelligence. Depending on (i) the task the system needs to solve (in AI), or
(ii) the task the system solves in a manner which needs understanding and ex-
plaining (in cognitive science), such representations range from image schemas
[14], frames [16], scripts [27], to spatial templates, conceptual spaces [8] and
mental models [12]. All such terms make the case for structured representation,
which has implementation, modeling and comprehension value in cognitive sys-
tems. They also point towards the need for structure and coherence in a cognitive
agent’s knowledge base.
This structure might be an empirical reality of human minds, or simply an
artefact of the quest for modeling cognitive systems (a debate which won’t be
engaged here). However, analysing the interaction between such representational
structure and information that enters the system can be useful in formulating
cognitive measures of informativity.
2.2 Using representation structure for measures of informativity
Natural cognitive systems generally have knowledge bases which are dynamic
and plastic [24, 3]. This supports their ability to learn, to recall and change in-
formation previously held. However, acting on and manipulating this knowlege
base, which can be thought of as long-term memory, encounters the bottleneck
of working memory [1]. Thus research on cognitive load [31] and processes of pro-
ductive/creative thought like analogy [9, 11] and metaphor [13] indicate that new
information is often compared to information previously held in the knowledge
base, and the ability to ground previous information in older structures gener-
ally helps comprehension, the knowledge acquiring process and the production
of new information.
To add new information to the system, the nature and structure of the previ-
ously held information is thus relevant. In order to propose cognitive measures of
informativity which can deﬁne the impact a piece of information can have on a
cognitive system, metrics which reﬂect the structure and elements of information
held in the initial knowledge base of the system are needed.
No normative comments on what such representation structures should be are
made here. However, a theoretical framework with hybrid representations which
can be used to further deﬁne informativity measures has been described [20, 21]
and will be used as a further tool for the following examples. We summarize
some of the principles of this framework in the following.
Take a cognitive systemA, with a set of sensory modalities S and S1, S2, ...Sn ∈
S. The features encoded through such sensory modalities are categorized in fea-
ture maps, depending on the sensory modality they elicit. Such feature maps are
then used for comparison whenever encoding or recognizing a new but similar
object, and help future creative problem-solving endeavours of the cognitive sys-
tem [20]. Each object seen is an activation of sensory features in these respective
feature maps. These maps can contain knowledge of color, shape, motion and
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any other thing which can be gathered via sensory input, including information
on the state of the agent. Objects and other concepts are further encoded as rep-
resentation structures RS [20]. From the knowledge representation perspective,
both concrete and abstract concepts are collections of data (activation of fea-
tures spaces) which cluster in a viable RS (viability is deﬁned below). Abstract
concepts and more complex representation structures are anchored on other con-
crete concepts. Furthermore, these can be assembled in meaningful groups of RS
based on context (what objects are encountered together), consequence (what
happens if a particular motion is initiated with speciﬁc types of objects) and in-
clude interpretations for the agent (what the consequences of particular strings
of events or spatial positioning of objects, etc. will be on the goals and needs of
the agent).
From this perspective, a new informant can be:
(i) a new concept - which will normally create a new RS;
(ii) information on a previous concept - which adds to a previous RS or in
other ways rectiﬁes already held information;
(iii) a new higher level RS which is added based on already held concept(s)
- e.g. A learns to use previously known objects/concepts in the context of a new
problem;
(iv) a higher level RS is modiﬁed - e.g. A learns new consequences for a
previously held routine, or learns to integrate a new object in that routine, etc.
Learning new concepts or higher level representations structures like in (i)
and (iii) is a costly process, and various prerequisites might need to exist for
this, like the concepts for encoding the higher RS (see Section 4). Modiﬁcations
of previous RS like in (ii) and (iv) might depend: on a) the strength of encoding
of previous information or b) the strength (measured as importance or salience)
of the new information shown. Generally, the pre-existing structure of the KB
might play a determining role on whether the informant can be integrated (see
Section 5).
This framework of representation is general enough to allow further adap-
tation and thus support the discussion about informativity measures in various
systems, cognitive architectures and the human mind. To explain the proposed
cognitive informativity measures, representation structure (RS) will be used as
a base unit (with the plural RSs), where a viable RS is a stable, meaningful,
useful set of features in the knowledge base of the system or agent.
These viability constraints to representaton structures stand for a bare min-
imum, and might be incomplete. This is a short description of each:
- A RS generally has to be stable - it can be encoded with ease by the system,
no strong competition exists in parsing the features in the subsymbolic plane in
a diﬀerent RS. This is a noteworthy point as various interpretations of the same
sets of features can exist, as illustrated by bistable perception [15].When the
representation structures build on pre-existing concepts, diﬀerences in encoding
at lower levels can propagate upwards in abstract concepts or higher level repre-
sentation structures. Furthermore, higher RS might be encoded in diﬀerent sets
of concepts from agent to agent. However, stable representation seems to be the
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norm, possibly based on neural and cognitive economy grounds, with changes in
representation being the event.
- A RS has to be meaningful - representation structures are place holders for
something in or about the world (which includes the agent itself, its interaction
with the world and internal world), or about other RSs. The agent uses RSs
to make sense of the world. Their degree of accuracy does not necessarily over-
lap with their meaningfulness, as such placeholders are needed by the cognitive
system for a world interpretation3. Some RS can be more meaningful (and thus
more inﬂuential) than others, gathering together an interpretation of the world
and the position of the agent in it, or holding a keystone role within the system.
- A RS has to be useful. This reﬂects the overt or covert interest of the
agent in acquiring or creating that RS. Such usefulness can be reﬂected at many
levels: thinking about the world and understanding it (meaningfulness), solving
problems (functional), creating new artifacts (expressive), some of which solve
problems (expressive/functional).
2.3 Ways of knowing
Various ways of knowing an object or concept can be accounted for by: (1)
diﬀerent sensory experiences, (2) diﬀerent types of knowledge representations,
(3) diﬀerent associative links and (4) relations encoded for those representations.
For example:
(1) Agent A1 knows object O1 with sensors S1, S2, while agent A2 knows
object O1 with sensors S2, S3.
For example, let’s take O1(KBAX ) to represent the knowledge agent AX has
in its KB about object O1. If A1 = John,A2 = Mary,O1 = curtain, S1 =
size, S2 = color, S3 = texture:
- curtain(KBJohn) ⊃ {200cm∗220cm, orange54} – John has seen the curtain
in someone’s house but didn’t touch it.
- while curtain(KBMary) ⊃ {orange6, soft3} – Mary has seen an touched a
sample of the curtain in a catalogue;
(2) Even if sensor S2 is shared, feature f(S2,O1) can be categorized in KBA1
and KBA2 in proximity to diﬀerent features, depending on what else each agent
already knows/stores.
Thus, in our example, the orange perceived by John might have been classiﬁed
close to bright orange or the color of another concept - ﬁre, while Mary might
classify it as Salmon orange or next to pink ;
3 If no other RSs are known, or the cognitive cost of replacing them is too high,
possibly by having a knock-on eﬀect of destroying (entire systems of) other RSs,
RSs might be kept in place even when proven wrong by the environment. Errors of
judgement and biases are common place for natural cognitive systems. This points
to meaningfulness being and important requirement (and possibly more important
than truthfulness.)
4 Shades of color and texture are represented here with numbers as to reﬂect their
perception by a visual or tactile sensor.
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(3) Encoding of f(S2,O1) in diﬀerent places in the sensory map, and in diﬀerent
object contexts yields diﬀerent associative links in KBA1 and KBA2.
Thus for John this might yield an association to sunset, while to Mary an
association to candy.;
(4) Such diﬀerent encoding can predispose future ease of access, making
f(S2,O1) easier to interpret by diﬀerent relations, out of which its embedding
in further RSs might depend.
Thus John might want the curtain for his bedroom, while Mary might think
through her association to candy that it is only appropriate for a child’s room.
Knowing size might enable John to come up with the creative use “can be used
as a rope” for the curtain. While knowing texture, Mary could come up, for the
same curtain, with the creative uses “can be used wrapped as a pillow, or to clear
leaks if nothing else is in hand”.
Cognitive systems are dynamic systems which can represent various proper-
ties of the objects at hand, depending on their own goals, interest, context, or
recent biases. Conversely, various ways of knowing a property can be anchored in
knowledge about diﬀerent sets of objects or more concrete concepts which con-
tain that property. In a sense, knowledge about any object is always incomplete
- as further knowledge could always be collected if one would possess a diﬀerent
type of sensor, would have studied the object from a diﬀerent angle or would
know about other signiﬁcant functional relations of the object to other objects.
This makes human communication imprecise, however it doesn’t impede it. It
just emphasizes the fact that two agents that both “know” the same object,
might hold overlapping but diﬀerent types of information and context about it.
From the perspective of productive cognitive systems, this imperfection in
communication has problem-solving advantages. Thus, informants transmitted
by A1 to A2 might not be considered in the same knowledge conﬁguration, but
might ﬁt RSs held in KBA2 and help solve a problem Px for A2, which they
wouldn’t have solved for A1 due to the way the informant was embedded in
KBA1 or its representation structures.
One could retort that, as the knowledge in artiﬁcial cognitive systems can be
(in many encoding paradigms) examined, two artiﬁcial agents can indeed bring
the same knowledge, representation structure or interpretation of an external
object to the table, and that in this case, the grounding of the object is perfectly
equivalent (the agents are both talking about exactly the same thing). However, if
these systems apply cognitive processes which include an ability to comprehend
knowledge in relation to other knowledge held in their knowledge base, this
equivalence depends on how each object is positioned within the KB itself,
what other knowledge is closely related, what other objects are similar, etc.
Two artiﬁcial systems would need to have exactly the same knowledge in the
same knowledge base structure to be equivalent. This could very well constitute
a case 0 of perfect communication (requiring 0-change for comprehension), in
which cognitive informativity measures would be irrelevant, and receiving an
informant would have an equivalent impact on both systems (due to their similar
knowledge structure).
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3 Principles of organization for a cognitive account of
informativity measures
Some subjective matters relevant for any information-transfer accounts are left
aside in the following.5 The account of informativity proposed here is based
on a comparison between the informant and knowledge already present in the
cognitive system, its organization and productive capacity.
In the following, three factors that such an account needs to address are
proposed and discussed. These three factors are:
1. The ways in which the information can be added to the system;
2. The coherence in the system;
3. The generativity of the system after the information addition.
Adding information to a cognitive system presupposes the system’s ability
(and sometimes interest) in encoding it. Here, the subjective matter of the sys-
tem’s interest is not addressed, only its ability and the eﬀort required to encode
the informant based on its sensors, the grounding hypothesis and organization
of the knowledge it already holds.
The coherence in the system’s knowledge base involves both lack of contra-
dictions and the ability to integrate and connect new and old information. This
is relevant to the system’s further ability to utilize the informant, or the parts
of the informant it has managed to integrate. This factor points to general mea-
sures of informativity which assess the impact the informant has on the structure
and connectivity of the knowledge base.
The generativity of the system is its ability to be productive (of artifacts,
solutions, ideas). Under the generativity factor, a measure of informativity is
proposed that reﬂects the change in productive capacity of a system after it has
received a particular information.
4 Adding information to a cognitive system (Input)
Developing on previous accounts of the grounding problem [10] and hypotheses of
how such grounding can be solved [2], in order for a cognitive system to be able to
represent, understand, memorize and utilize information, such a system needs to
be able to ground this information in sensory modalities or in previously acquired
knowledge. This points to two main question clusters about the informant which
are relevant from the cognitive system’s perspective:
1. Is the information groundable in the system, or representable by diﬀerent
information structures? Does the information ﬁt pre-owned structures? Do
the elements necessary for encoding the new piece of information exist? With
how much accuracy can the new information be encoded by the RSs in the
knowledge base? (the stable anchoring question)
5 These include, but are not limited to: goals of the system that receives such informa-
tion, its previous biases, current mood - an exploration-learning wide-focus versus
exploitation narrow-focus, etc.
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2. Is the information a new RS, does it present features of previous RSs, or does
it built upon them at a higher, more abstract level? (the type of informant
with raport to knowledge organization question)
The ﬁrst question asks whether elements required for representation are
present (anchoring perspective). The more elements present, the easier the in-
formation will be represented and therefore memorized and comprehended. The
easier the information is represented, the higher level RSs can be built on top of
it. The ﬁrst question also refers to whether competitive RSs might exists, which
might prevent such easy representation and grounding. If the informant is too
close to something the system already holds in its knowledge base, or provides
a concurrent but diﬀerent representation or interpretation, this might restrict
access to the previous knowledge, or it might prevent categorization.
The second question addresses where the informant can be embedded in the
knowledge base of the system. In this context, eﬀort of such embedding can be
discussed. Such eﬀort has to take into account: (i) sparsity of data; (ii) com-
petition in categorization in the knowledge base in which the encoding is done
(after the previous question has decided whether the encoding is at all possible),
and (iii) the amount of data that needs encoding. Thus acquiring an entire new
RS versus acquiring a feature for a previous RS might be comparable, from the
information-processing perspective, to the costs of adding a new class or datas-
tructure in an already working program, versus adding a new instantiation of a
former class. However, due to speciﬁc categorization-competition constraints in
cognitive systems, encoding an entirely new RS might be easier than encoding
and using an RS which competes with already encoded RSs, because of the reor-
ganization necessary in the knowledge base to accomodate the new informational
reﬁnement.
A non-exhaustive list of feature-RS and RS-RS ﬁtting examples is presented
in the following:
(i) new feature fy ﬁts previous unﬁtted but present slot in RSx
(ii) new feature fy can be added in a coherent non-competitive manner to RSx
(iii) new feature fy ﬁts RSx but as a consequence RSx has to change;
(iv) new feature fy competes with already encoded feature fz in Rx;
(v) new RSy can be anchored in elements already present in the KB (e.g. ﬁts
fa, fb, fc), without competition;
(vi) new RSy can be anchored in elements already present in the KB (e.g.
ﬁts fa, fb, fc), and is necessary for grouping these element (compression
constraints) or solving a problem;
(vii) new RSy can be anchored in elements already present in the KB, but
will encounter competition from RSz which is a diﬀerent interpretation or
category anchored in overlapping elements;
(viii) new RSy ﬁts higher level RSz, etc.
5 The Coherence in the system
Coherence in the system can be a measure of both the system’s lack of internal
contradictions, as well as a measure of the system’s general connectivity. The
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latter is addressed in the following, because of its relevance to productive sys-
tems. Coherence (as connectivity) in a system is responsible for easy navigation
or ﬂow between encoded pieces of knowledge. This impacts the system’s ability
to search for information, manipulate it and change it in a productive manner.
Let’s say a system uses links between its representation structures to navigate
its knowledge base. Various types of such links can be envisaged: (i) associative
links (RSa is like RSb in some way), (ii) relational links (which put two repre-
sentations in a relation to each other), (iii) functional links (which help express
a RS through a set of concepts or other RSs), etc.
Whether the coherence of the system is increased or decreased with the addi-
tion of new information should be an important factor in assessing an informant ’s
impact on a cognitive system. Conﬁrmation bias [18] and cognitive dissonance
[6] show that cognitive systems generally aim to keep a high level of coherence.
Attaining a higher level of coherence can make the system more productive: a
RSx which associates with an older RSa so that a NewLink(RSx, RSa) is pro-
duced, might provide new avenues to navigate the knowledge base, while a RSy
which produces a new association between two previous representation struc-
tures RSa and RSb, so that NewLink(RSa, RSy, RSb), will increase not just
coherence but might make the system able to construct a new representation
structure Rz = NewLink(RSa, RSy, RSb).
Informativity measures of a particular informant might be computed here in
terms of the state of the associative, relational or functional links in the system
after the informant has been integrated. Take the number of such links in theKB
of agent X at time ty to be represented by NoOfLinks(KBX , ty); the size of a
particular RSz at time ty to be represented by LengthOf(RSz, ty) and the num-
ber of unconnectedRSs inKBX at time ty to beNoOfUnconnectedRSs(KBX , ty).
An informant providing higher coherence could have as a consequence:
NoOfLinks(KBA, t1) >= NoOfLinks(KBA, t0);
LengthOf(RSz, t1|RSz ∈ KBA) >= LengthOf(RSz, t0|RSz ∈ KBA)6;
NoOfUnconnectedRSs(KBA, t1) <= NoOfUnconnectedRSs(KBA, t0);
when t0 is the previous and t1 the consequent time state at which the coher-
ence of the KB is assessed.
However, coherence decrease might also be beneﬁcial long-term, even if it
increases the short-term entropy of the system, or it leaves the system with too
many open questions. Knowing pieces of information in other ﬁelds might open
the system for future grounding of novel information, while a system that is
completely coherent might also be closed due to its stability. However the eﬀort
of encoding and holding in memory unconnected pieces of information might
initially be greater, despite their possible further uses. Cognitive systems could
futher be deﬁned through the individual threshold they put on lack of coherence.
New information can change the structure of the system’s knowledge base
(and its emphasis). Thus an important question in terms of knowledge base
integration is whether a new informant: (a) adds to existing structure, (b) helps
6 Note that this does not even start to tackle the diﬀerences in structure between RSz
at time t1 and RSz at time t0.
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connect it further or (c) helps parse it in any diﬀerent way. Information that
helps re-representing or re-interpreting older information (adds to the ways of
restructuring) would be particularly important from the generativity factor point
of view of productive systems.
6 The Generativity in the system
As mentioned earlier, information that helps future restructuring [5, 19] can be
useful for future dynamic progress of the system, and for its productivity - for
its ability to see objects and events of the world in a diﬀerent interpretative
light, and come up with new representation structures that solve problems or
otherwise generate useful artifacts.
Generally speaking, generativity is a matter of how much more new informa-
tion can be produced by the system. This can be taken to mean how many new
information-combination structures (that are stable) are possible, but also what
possibilites of discovery of new unknown elements are made available through
bringing forth more ﬂexibility in restructuring the old KB in new ways.
Thus new combinations can be achieved through transfer of previous RSs to
new feature sets, or learning new RSs which can interpret previous feature sets.
Others are combinations of previous RSs. Such processes might be spontaneous
or serendipitous, they might be due to cognitive and/or environmental context,
emergent due to overlapping features, or belabored. Some new combinations
are not complete - they point to higher-arching RSs that miss elements, thus
revealing gaps in knowledge.
One could consider all such possible new structures to represent the gen-
erativity capital of the system. However, in reality, due to cognitive economy
principles, such transfer is hard without previous connectivity in the system. A
RS will rarely be transferred to completely new features, unless it ﬁts them in
an unusually stable way. Two RSs might rarely connect without some previous
common features or some overarching new RS that comes as a response to a
problem. The Coherence factor might thus have instrumental consequences on
the Generativity factor.
In conclusion, the impact of a new informant on the generativity of a produc-
tive cognitive system can be assessed using questions of the following type: given
the original structure of the system, does the informant contain new features or
RSs such that:
– new (stable, meaningful, useful) RSs or external artifacts can be produced?7
– new connections are possible?
– new elements might be revealed as unknown?
– new restructuring possibilities appear? etc.
7 A cluster of connections might not yield a full blown representation structure, but
with the help of external expression and cognition, they might be compelling enough
for the cognitive system to explore, thus leading to new productive processes.
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7 Discussion and further work
After describing the Input, Coherence and Generativity factors, a tentative def-
inition of cognitive informativity, based on the relation between the information
transmitted and information receiver, can be made. Thus cognitive informativity
as deﬁned so far is a measure of (i) the eﬀort required to ground and integrate
the new information, (ii) the changes that occur in the knowledge structure of
the informant and (iii) the inﬂuence this information has on the productivity of
the system.
One might ask what the purpose of such informativity measures might be,
considering that the knowedge base of natural cognitive systems could be very
hard to estimate.
First, as we work towards artiﬁcial cognitive systems that can at least mimic
if not implement some of the adaptive powers of their natural counterparts, it
is important to remember that the knowledge in such systems can be measured
(and so is coherence, generativity) - therefore such cognitive informativity mea-
sures can be applied to artiﬁcial systems. For example, in the case of OROC [23],
adding knowledge about a new object to the KB might provide further gener-
ativity to the system. As OROC uses knowledge about similar objects to infer
aﬀordances, if an informant concept c4 (a ﬂowerpot) is of a similar shape and
material as a known object c3 (a cup), but has an aﬀordance which is unknown
to the system (to grow ﬂowers in), OROC will make the creative inference that
the older known object c3 might be used in the same manner, coming up with
the creative use “Maybe we can use a cup to grow ﬂowers in.”. Thus OROC’s
generativity will increase when it receives informants that can be coherently in-
tegrated within its KB. In OROC, such changes in generativity and coherence
could be measured.
Second, an open discussion of the limits implied by imperfect informativity
might bring further analytic tools for the learning sciences, processes of commu-
nication, communication theory and HCI. A ﬁrst estimate which compares the
initial knowledge base of the informee to the informant can yield further assess-
ments of the ways in which the informant should be communicated, or previous
representational structures can be put in place, thus smoothing the communi-
cation or learning process, making clearer the possible gaps of knowledge and
signiﬁcantly increasing the informativity of the informant.
Third, if the information processing metaphor is taken quite far into the
cognitive science ground, the principles of cognitive economy and measures of
computational complexity could imperfectly align to be each other’s counter-
parts. This means that one should think about computational complexity under
a bounded rationality paradigm, in terms of generativity (what avenues can a
cognitive system explore), rather then perfect variants (given enough memory
and time, can a system get there). This perspective centers on the informativity
a system can obtain from its environment given its internal structure (thus it is
individualized and goal-oriented). Artiﬁcial agents with limited knowledge and
deﬁned knowledge structures, processing in real-time noisy environments could
strongly beneﬁt from it.
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The purpose of this paper has been to introduce the idea of a need for cog-
nitive measures of informativity for productive systems, and to propose a model
based on three factors which aﬀect cognitive systems - Input (grounding), Co-
herence and Generativity. This introduction can beneﬁt from further work which
will formalize in a rigorous manner the measures of informativity proposed here
as a function of each factor.
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